11/18/2024 Eitvydas Bajarūnas.

Our grasp and response to hybrid threats has evolved dramatically since their modern emergence. Russia's sophisticated deployment of hybrid methods in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 initially caught the international community off guard, marking a watershed moment in contemporary conflicts. Hybrid threats – known by another names, such as malign activities, gray zone tactics, asymmetric warfare, or irregular tactics - are not a new phenomenon. They have been a part of international conflicts for decades and involve a blend of conventional and unconventional methods, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic pressure, military provocations, and covert operations, exploiting the vulnerabilities of modern, interconnected societies. As some experts have noted, “hybrid warfare intentionally blurs the distinction between the times of peace and war making it hard for the targeted countries to devise policy responses in a proper and timely manner” [1]. Both state and non-state actors use hybrid tactics all while avoiding the threshold of full-scale military conflict. Some experts coined the term "weaponization of everything" [2].
The most common and effective response to hybrid threats is resilience. This involves an all-government approach, ensuring coordination between national institutions and international actors to address the complexities of these threats. Firstly, open societies are ever more connected within and between one another. Secondly, any response should involve the whole of society to counter threats effectively. To this end, the presented model addresses different “spaces” of society (governance, civic, and services), as well as different “levels” (international, national, and local) and, most importantly, their mutual interactions. A special focus is placed on disinformation, one of the key tools used in hybrid warfare. Efforts such as fact-checking and enhancing media literacy are crucial in countering false narratives and misinformation [3].
However, even the most resilient states are not immune to hybrid threats, and resilience alone is often insufficient to completely prevent harm. Moreover, as a largely reactive measure, resilience can inadvertently encourage adversaries to innovate and continuously implement new hybrid strategies. While bolstering resilience can mitigate immediate impacts, it risks creating a defensive-only stance that adversaries like Russia or other state actors can exploit, forcing resilient states into a cycle of constantly patching emerging vulnerabilities.
Therefore, to address Russia’s hybrid tactics, establishing an effective deterrence-by-punishment strategy should be implemented proactively. It should go hand-in-hand with ongoing efforts to bolster resilience across vulnerable sectors, ensuring that response capabilities are not only robust but sustainable. It best explained to a “if you do this, you’ll face significant consequences.”
Suppose you live in respectable neighborhood, but you’ve got a troublesome asocial neighbor who regularly harasses your family. Suggesting just avoid him - come to terms with it (aka don’t escalate). Then, ask smart expert to give a lecture on “Why harassment is wrong as a social phenomenon”. It’s fine, but does it make you feel safer? Alternative - to collect evidences, gather a few neighbors and issue an ultimatum to this troublesome person directly: if he keeps this up, he’ll face consequences. The latter option sounds more preferable.
Lithuania’s experience from hostile actions from Russia/USSR all through the Baltic annexation in 1940s and then 1990s up to the supposedly benign Yeltsin era shows – if not confronted Russia sees no point to stop harassing.
Russia’s hybrid actions are on surge, particularly aggressive and sometimes lethal: cyber-attacks, social media manipulation shaping public perceptions on sensitive issues, such as immigration or support to Ukraine, and blending “classical” hybrid threats with more direct, kinetic sabotage methods [4].
Western understanding and reaction to Russia’s malign actions have moved significantly since they first came to prominence in 2014. Unfortunately, even with continues brutal war against Ukraine, the response is inadequate, a “come to terms with it”.
Experts already urging for a robust Western strategy to counter Russia's actions [5]. To achieve this, the West must shift from the outdated 1990s perspective of viewing Russia “as a problem" to embracing a "counter-Russia" stance.
The West already have embraced, rightfully so, resilience-building (deterrence-by-denial). However, even the most resilient states appeared vulnerable to hybrid threats, and resilience alone often falls short of preventing harm. As a largely reactive measure, resilience encourages adversaries to deploy new malign strategies, forcing states into a vicious cycle.
What principles are applied to make Russia to think twice fearing consequences?
First, clear communication. It’s vital to signal the resolve and capability to retaliate. Strategic ambiguity can also be applied to keep Russia uncertain about the precise nature of the response. Second, solidarity among international partners amplifies the impact of any response, distributing the burden and presenting a united stance against hybrid aggression. Finally, credible deterrence is built through decisive responses to hybrid threats. Inaction or a lack of resolve undermines deterrence from the outset, as failing to impose costs can inadvertently encourage further aggression [6].
Some deterrence-by-punishment measures against Russia are already on the way: NATO and the EU attribution of Russia’s misbehavior (“naming and shaming”) based on intelligence sharing; [7] diplomatic actions as expelling Russians spies from the embassies; cyber offence; restricting Russia’s influence in strategic sectors and diminishing economic leverage; fortifying NATO presence in Eastern Europe, and ramping up support for Ukraine.
Being confronted by creative adversary we should be creative as well. In the same way Ukrainians brought war back to Russia (drones attacking targets in Russia or Kursk), we also should make Russia to bear consequences of malign activities [8].
Information sharing (“naming and shaming”):
Encourage governments and civil societies more actively gather credible evidence and share it openly with both the public and international partners.
Encourage NATO and the EU to proactively share internally information about vulnerabilities that they pose.
Enhance collaboration among Western intelligence agencies and global partners in order to improve monitoring of potential smuggling routes, and sanctions evasion.
Economic and financial measures:
Target with economic and property sanctions Russian decision-makers, oligarchs, and entities directly involved in hybrid activities.
Provide financial rewards or relief from sanctions for Russians who break with Russian regime state policies.
Target Russian investments in major real estate markets such as London or Cyprus.
Address Russia’s use of a “shadow fleet” or proxies that bypasses oil and gas sanctions.
Legal measures:
File indictments and pursue legal action against hostile actors involved in hybrid actions.
Cyber:
Dismantle Russian-controlled or state-backed hacker groups botnets and disable servers involved in cyberattacks.
Establish a robust framework for lawful access to encrypted data - while respecting fundamental rights - to support the activities of the EU and NATO member states’ law enforcement and security authorities.
Media:
Expose and disrupt disinformation campaigns through media platforms - both social and traditional.[9] Publicly identify and remove accounts or networks that spread false information.
Undermine the influence of Russian state-sponsored media operating out of NATO and EU countries. Impose secondary sanctions targeting entities that provide logistical or financial support to these media outlets.
Utilize Western media platforms to counter Russian propaganda.
Shape public sentiment, and promote democratic values in Russia. Employ independent media platforms, supporting Russian dissident and civil society movements, promote Russian exile and independent journalists, and leverage social media and digital campaigns.
Combat Russian historical revisionism with factual narratives.
Counter-sabotage:
Encourage NATO to counter sabotage operations and covert military actions with snap military exercises, increased troop deployments in vulnerable areas, port visits, and enhanced air and maritime patrols.
Establish an anti-sabotage network to support member states in preventing and responding to incidents.
Update NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense to counter threats from drones or other flying objects [10].
Employ countermeasures and signal-protection technologies in response to jamming of civilian and military communications, GPS, and broadcasts.
Threaten to disrupt Russian logistical pathways.
Support member states facing instrumentalized migration.
Other measures:
Integrate both NATO’s military capabilities and the EU’s regulatory, economic, and diplomatic tools in a single framework.
Bolster Russia’s neighbors against hybrid threats by enhancing resilience, response and intelligence-sharing capabilities.
Encourage NATO and the EU to establish and regularly update the list of Russia's vulnerabilities and major actors involved in malign activities.
Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and currently a Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA) Visiting Fellow. Assessments and views expressed in the article are those of the author and should not be treated as the official position of the MFA of the Republic of Lithuania.
[1] Cederberg,A. & Eronen, P. “How can Societies be Defended against Hybrid Threats?” Strategic Security Analysis, No. 9, 2015, https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/194510
[2] Galeotti M., The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War, Yale University Press, 2022, https://politicstoday.org/weaponisation-of-everything-new-way-of-war/
[3] Comprehensive overview on resilience: Aho A., Alonso Villota M., Giannopoulos G., Jungwirth R., Lebrun M., Savolainen J., Smith H., Willkomm E., HybridCOE paper, April 20, 2023, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-threats-a-comprehensive-resilience-ecosystem/
[5] https://cepa.org/article/new-normal-impunity/ https://cepa.org/article/getting-to-ouch-hybrid-deterrence/
[6] chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Guidelines-for-the-Deterrence-of-Hybrid-Threats-HCSS-2023.pdf
[7] As example https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russian-indictment-election-interference.html
[8] A report by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, on how to enhance Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness contains many good ideas for the EU actions: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf. Some of the proposals could appear among the list of practical measures while implementing the Washington 2024 Summit Declaration’s decision regarding the potential activation of Article 5 if hybrid actions threaten the security.
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