EU borders can easily be closed to Russian agents

09/25/2023 Remigijus Simasius.

Two reasons why the EU borders remain open to the type of Russian citizens whom it must keep out in the first instance. And how to fix this negligence. By CPI senior advisor Remigijus Šimašius.

Can we say that the EU’s borders are safe from the abuse by the agents of the Kremlin regime? No, we cannot. And this is not just a small vulnerability. It is a massive (hopefully not a deliberate) access route which helps the entry into the EU precisely of those whom we most need to keep out: Kremlin agents, potential saboteurs and private criminals.

The EU has significantly minimised the travel of ordinary Russians to the EU. These restrictions are rational and much needed, but being implemented in quite indiscriminatory matter dramatically affect even those opposing the regime, vulnerable to repressions, and otheres completelly disatached from the regime. The recent ban of cars with Russian registration plates is definitely contributing to this as well.

The life of oligarchs has also been made less comfortable by the sanctions. Russia itself in a way contributes to this EU effort, using the opportunity to force oligarchs to bring their assets back to Russia.

However, there are most probably even more Russian agents in the EU today than there were a year ago. There are two major reasons why.

The EU does not apply biometric checks at the border

The first reason why the EU is still open to unfriendly travellers (not just from Russia) is simply that it simply does not implement its own targets. It is no problem for those who are not welcome in the EU to enter it, as biometric checks are not fully implemented at the border (which leads to the use of fake passports on a potentially enormous scale). Given the absence of internal borders within the Schengen area and the various entry policies applied, Russians have unlimited access to all Schengen countries.

This problem still exists because the Commission has not been able to deliver on its promise to introduce biometric checks for those entering the EU (https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/entry-exit-system-ees/). The start of the project was too late. The delivery period was too long. The targeted delivery date of autumn 2022 (as declared in June 2022 (https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/eu-to-launch-biometric-entry-exit-system-in-a-few-months/) was postponed. At the moment there is no declared deadline for implementation (https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/eu-confirms-it-doesnt-have-a-date-for-implementation-of-entry-exit-system-yet/).

The situation is far from normal and looks more like sabotage than the usual inefficiency. The gatekeepers have forgotten to lock up – even though they know the enemy is at the gates!

For this problem to be solved, serious investigation is required. So, most importantly, is the full attention of the highest EU institutions.

The EU does not prohibit all active supporters of the war from entering

The second problem is less technical and more political. Wile some of the EU countries, like the Baltic countries, introduced extremely tight restrictions, many others, mostly in Southern EU countries, are quite relaxed. Russia’s wealthy minority (the most privileged 1-3% of the Russian population) still have good legal opportunities to travel and enjoy the benefits of a free society in the EU. As a result of Russia's economic structure, people belonging to this privileged group do not feel much of a burden from sanctions. Indeed, they sometimes even benefit from sanctions, since these eliminate Western competition for their businesses, while schemes for bypassing sanctions create even more business opportunities for them. Not surprisingly those privileged people are getting more and more untouched by the pain inflicted by the war, more and more cynical – and more and more supportive of the Russian status quo.

The security problem related to this situation is much bigger than decision makers might think. While travelling back and forth to Europe, many of those belonging to this privileged group are not strongly averse to taking part themselves in a little spying in the EU. There is clear evidence that Russians who spend much of their time abroad (often in Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, and other EU countries, as well as Switzerland, the UK and elsewhere), and visit Russia occasionally, are easily targeted by the FSB (the Federal Security Service, successor to the foreign arm of the Soviet-era KGB). The FSB has serious leverage against such people, so even those who are neutral or skeptical of the Kremlin are forced to collaborate with Moscow’s secret services against European countries.

The EU and other European countries must take urgent steps to address this issue. Setting clear goals is the key to dealing with the issue of Russians in Europe. The goals should be:

1. To provide a safe shelter for Kremlin critics and defectors, as well as ordinary Russian citizens.

2. To protect the EU from Kremlin/FSB influence and espionage.

3. To impose personal sanctions on those who have contributed in any way to Kremlin aggression (who must number at least a couple of million).

And some very specific and practical actions should be taken urgently.

The EU countries should require all Russian citizens wanting to enter the EU to answer a questionnaire before doing so. In this questionnaire, the person seeking entry – as a citizen of an aggressor state – should be asked whether he/she:

(1) has, directly or indirectly, participated in an unlawful attack on Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova;

(2) has visited the territory of any of these countries without entry documents issued by them;

(3) has participated in actions violating the human rights of those opposing the Russian regime; or

(4) belongs to the armed structures or secret services of the Russian state, or to political structures (political parties) associated with the regime.

If a person answers any of these questions positively, he/she should be questioned personally in depth before being allowed into the country (if he/she is allowed in at all).

If those questioned answer positively and want to defect, the opportunity to do so must be provided – but not the opportunity to fight European values from inside the EU.

And if the person answers negatively and is found to be lying, he/she should feel immediate consequences, including a permanent prohibition on entering the EU.

The key elements of such a solution have already been implemented by Lithuania already, and could be enhanced and used universally in the EU.

Similar rules should be tailored for – and applied to – citizens of Belarus as well.

Of course. this approach is not a “silver bullet” that can solve the problem of espionage and hostile people entering the EU. But it would at least create a legal mechanism to expel those who are lying. It would also make it more complicated for Russian citizens to play a double game – enjoying both the fruits of collaboration with the aggressor and the advantages of life in a free European country.